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The problem of global distributive justice 
in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples 
Marta Soniewicka 
Introduction 
In the 20th century modern political and moral philosophy has returned, 
thanks to John Rawls, to the considerations of justice. However, these reflections 
regarding ‘what justice is’ were strictly limited to the borders of states. Peter 
Singer, one of the first philosophers in the 20th century who argued for a global 
approach to ethics, was extremely amazed, as he said, that the most influential 
work on justice – Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, failed to discuss the issue of injustice 
between different societies.1 The question of global justice gained great concern 
with such a significant contribution to the debate of the works written by Charles 
Beitz, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge, Onora O’Neill and Peter Singer – to name only 
the most important ones.2 The central question of the current liberal debate over 
global justice is how the requirements of justice are to be transformed from a do-
mestic to global scope. And since Rawlsian justice as fairness is still the main in-
spiration for all discussions on justice, many philosophers concentrated their re-
search on the question, whether to globalize or not to globalize Rawls. It confirms the 
Robert Nozick thesis that: ‘political philosophers now must either work within 
Rawls’ theory or explain why not’.3 Such cosmopolitans as Pogge or Beitz argue 
for globalizing Rawls, i.e. extending Rawlsian justice as fairness to the world at 
large.4 They derive all the consequences from A Theory of Justice, applied to the 
global realm and argue for the global difference principle and protection of uni-
versal human rights. But John Rawls himself rejects the cosmopolitan idea and 
formulates his own conception of international justice5 in The Law of Peoples. 
                                                 
1 Rawls considers in his A Theory of Justice the question of justice in international relations only in 
one paragraph concerned with a matter of conscientious refusal (in the book 514 pages long, this 
question takes 4 pages – see Rawls [1999a], §58, p. 331-335. 
2 I refer to such significant positions on global justice as: Beitz [1979], Barry [1991], Pogge [1989] 
and [2005], O’Neill [2003], Singer [1972] and [2002]. 
3 Nozick [1974] p. 183. 
4 Pogge [1989] p. 211-280; Beitz [1979] p. 129-184. See also Buchanan [2004] p. 132 ff. 
5 One may distinguish international justice from global justice. International justice is usually de-
fined as justice concerning international relations – a set of principles to govern international con-
 
Marta Soniewicka     The problem of global distributive justice in Rawls’s The Law… 
 46 
The main goal of this essay is to analyse the problem of limiting distributive 
justice to state borders in Rawlsian conception. Let me start with a short presenta-
tion of Rawlsian arguments. Then I will turn to five objections that may, in my 
opinion, arise here: (1) consistency problem; (2) status of principles of a law of 
peoples; (3) a method of justification; (4) self-sufficiency of states; (5) tolerance. 
A duty of assistance 
The only redistributive principle of justice among peoples according to 
Rawlsian idea of the law of peoples is a duty of assistance to the so-called burdened 
societies that experience unfavourable conditions. These societies should be as-
sisted to reach the conditions which make establishing and maintaining just politi-
cal institutions possible. The main idea is, that by a duty of assistance basic human 
rights should be secured everywhere, and basic human needs should be met. In a 
domestic case, Rawls means by basic needs those that will be met, if persons are in 
a position to take intelligent and effective advantage of their liberties and to have a 
reasonable and decent life. By the way of analogy, basic needs for peoples are those 
that will be met, if peoples are in a position to take advantage of the rights, liber-
ties, and opportunities of their society. In other words, basic needs guarantee so-
cieties the possibility of having functional liberal or decent government.6 The only aim 
of the law of peoples, is to guarantee the transformation of all societies into well-
ordered ones that are the full members of a society of peoples. This mere duty of 
assistance is not aimed at reducing social and economic inequalities among the 
societies, since the law of peoples has no other aims, as for example: making the 
standard of life higher than is needed to maintain the institutions. Moreover, a 
duty of assistance refers only to assistance towards burdened societies, which are 
neither liberal, nor well-ordered. According to the law of peoples, the well-
ordered societies have no duties of distribution or redistribution of goods towards 
each other. Of course, the law of peoples does not exclude the possibility that well-
                                                                                                                                                    
duct (i.e. justice at the level of states, not individuals). Global justice, on the other hand, is usually 
defined as justice concerning a single regime to the whole world (i.e. justice at the level of indi-
viduals but extended to the world at large, irrespective of state borders). In my further considera-
tion I shall use the term ‘global justice’ in wider meaning – as any kind of justice that provide prin-
ciples of just conduct beyond state borders. 
6 The term ‘decency’ referred to peoples has a normative character (as the notion ‘reasonable’). 
Peoples have to meet two conditions to be recognised as decent (well-ordered ones): (1) they re-
spect political and social order of the other societies and honour rights of peaceful conduct (they 
are not aggressive and expansionist states); (2) their legal systems secure for all their citizens basic 
human rights, impose duties and obligations on all persons within its territory and are legitimated 
by their citizens (recognised as consistent with the common good and idea of justice). Rawls 
[1999c] §8.2., p. 64-67. 
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ordered societies establish a cooperative association which provides the other ob-
ligations or regulations of mutual assistance but this remains beyond the domain 
of duties. Two main reasons, according to Rawls for limiting demands of distribu-
tive justice in international realm to a mere duty of assistance are: (1) an assump-
tion of the self-sufficiency of states and (2) tolerance as a basic requirement of liberal-
ism. 
Objection 1: consistency problem 
One of the most frequently given objections to the law of peoples is that it is 
inconsistent with the main Rawlsian project – justice as fairness. However conser-
vative and complicated the law of peoples seems to be, this objection has failed, in 
my opinion. 
Cosmopolitans usually argue that Rawls does not care about persons, but 
only cares about societies and favours common good over individual rights. As 
cosmopolitans maintain, if we grant that all individuals are free and equal in their 
rights, there should be one global original position where individuals, not repre-
sentatives of states, choose principles of justice. If we proceed from the world as a 
whole and create a global original position, so the argument goes, we would work 
out a liberal global justice, where the principle of equality of rights and liberties 
for all individuals would be accepted just as it were within a state. To take this 
argument one step further, in a global original position, a question, whether there 
should be states or peoples at all, should be examined. Supporters of the cosmo-
politan idea maintain that state borders are another arbitrary reason, just as sex, 
talents and race, that should be rejected while considering principles of justice. 
Therefore, individuals placed behind the veil of ignorance should choose such 
principles of justice that will guarantee the best possible position of the globally 
least advantaged individual. 
Rawls presents in The Law of Peoples another point of view and it does not 
remain in contradiction with justice as fairness. Let me explain it briefly. As far as 
state borders are concerned, Rawls claims that ‘there must be boundaries of some 
kind’ to define the responsibility for the land which is our common property.7 
Having the government, which is an effective agent of the people, we can deter-
mine the responsibility for the particular territory, maintaining its environmental 
integrity and the size of population. Otherwise, if nobody or everybody is respon-
sible for maintaining an asset, that asset tends to deteriorate. The law of peoples is 
not aimed at establishing a world state which, according to Kant, would be either 
                                                 
7 Ibid., §4.3., p. 39; see also: Walzer [1985] p. 38 ff. 
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a global despotism or a global anarchy.8 And since there is no global state, state 
boundaries are to be taken as natural facts, however arbitrary they seem to appear 
from the historical point of view. As he argues: ‘The Law of Peoples proceeds from 
the international political world as we see it, and concerns what the foreign policy 
of a reasonably just liberal people should be.’9 
What is more, peoples represent different conceptions of justice and have 
different forms of government or legal order. In accordance with a reasonable po-
litical conception of justice, a liberal society is obliged to respect other societies organ-
ized by comprehensive doctrines, provided their political and social institutions. We 
should respect a right for a group of people joined in one state to decide about 
themselves, their conception of justice and their rights. And an individualistic ap-
proach is impossible in the global dimension since nonliberal states would never 
agree to it. Claiming for one global original position for all inhabitants of the 
world, we would claim that all of them have the same rights as inhabitants of lib-
eral democratic societies. Liberal democratic order is not a universal paradigm but 
a product of long-lasting process – efforts and acquires of western civilisation. Of 
course its historical, local origin does not imply that the liberal values that it pro-
motes are not universal ones. But it does entail that liberal democratic principles 
are to a certain degree dependent on specific political culture that has been devel-
oped by western countries for years. Even if we find liberal democratic constitu-
tions as the best ones, we cannot assume that it would be seen as the best ones by 
all peoples and that it would bring about the same results in all cultures. Thus, we 
definitely cannot force any societies to adopt them. For the same reason we have 
to reject the global difference principle that would not be accepted in international 
pluralistic realm as too egalitarian and peculiarly liberal one. What is more, a dif-
ference principle is suitable only between persons who are relevantly situated 
within the form of cooperation found within a territorial state. If there is no global 
state, so the argument goes, there is no global basic structure, i.e. institutional 
framework of social cooperation to which two principles of justice as fairness can 
be applied.10 
                                                 
8 See: Kant [1999], first supplement, p. 113. 
9 Rawls [1999c] §11.1., p. 83. 
10 A basic structure of a society is a subject of social justice and means a scheme of the major social 
institutions (i.e. the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements) that 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine division of a cooperative surplus in a soci-
ety (Rawls [1999a] p. 6 ff.). 
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Objection 2: status of principles of a law of peoples 
But even granted that Rawlsian conception of global justice is compatible 
with justice as fairness, there arise some other important questions. First of all, the 
status of the principles of justice is not clear. Rawls does not make it evident 
whether a duty of assistance and guaranteeing basic human rights are real princi-
ples of global justice enforced by law or only mere declarations of morality of 
states. The question is whether burdened societies have a claim-right to be assisted or it 
is left to the decision and benevolence of well-ordered states. And if burdened so-
cieties have a claim-right to be assisted, it remains an open question what kind of 
institutions are responsible for enforcing these duties. There is no global government or 
above-national institutions but only an agreement which is a source of rights and 
duties. And burdened societies are not parties to this agreement so only well-
ordered societies can demand enforcement of the principles of agreement. It seems 
unconvincing that well-ordered societies feel bounded and obliged to each other 
with this common duty of assistance to other societies that are not parties to their 
contract. The same objection regards the duty of guaranteeing basic human rights. 
It is clear that this condition is to be met by all members of a society of peoples but 
the relation between members and non-members of a society of peoples remains 
unclear. It is said that states should only intervene if, the so-called outlaw societies 
violate basic human rights, but it is not evident if they ought to. If we find a duty of 
assistance as only a kind of moral duty of charity, and guarantee of basic human 
rights as imperfect declaration, the law of peoples would not differ from weak in-
ternational law applied in the current world order based on mutual advantage 
and unbinding agreements. This is the reason why Rawlsian law of peoples is fre-
quently objected as granting the status quo. 
Trying to read the law of peoples in accordance to justice as fairness, I claim 
for interpreting the principles of the law of peoples as principles of justice – duties 
that are to be enforced. The problem I pointed out above means that the law of peo-
ples is not fully worked out and that it should be supported by some kind of above-
national institutional framework. It does not have to be a global government but it 
has to be capable of enforcing the principles of justice by some coercive instru-
ments. How it is possible – is quite another question. If the principles of justice are 
accepted by everybody, development of appropriate institutions to enforce these 
principles would be the next step, consequently accepted on the same grounds of 
necessity of limiting sovereignty. 
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Objection 3: a method of justification 
My further objection, or the whole set of objections, regards a matter of jus-
tification and the method used by Rawls. The international original position seems 
unclear to me. Rawls aims in The Law of Peoples at proving that liberal principles of 
global justice are reasonable and that they would be accepted by nonliberal decent 
peoples too. But actually I think that he assumes something that he wants to 
prove. If it is true that we first assume that liberal peoples are to develop princi-
ples of global justice that are to be accepted by nonliberal decent peoples, we can 
ask why do they not meet in an original position to do this job together. Rawls ar-
gues that the whole idea of a social contract has a liberal character and that the 
principles of global justice are a consequence of adopting domestic liberal concep-
tions of justice (based on the liberal idea of public reason that is not known to 
nonliberal peoples). But then, I cannot understand why nonliberal peoples actu-
ally accept these liberal principles. If nonliberal decent peoples are domestically 
governed by comprehensive doctrines that determine their internal policy and 
lead to favouritism of some citizens over other ones, it is not clear why their inter-
national conduct is not governed by their comprehensive doctrines in the same 
way as it is domestically. Why should they accept pluralism in international rela-
tions and equality of peoples if it is inconsistent with their comprehensive doc-
trines? 
Rawls answers that we should distinguish between respect to the right of 
equality between peoples and respect to the right of equality to citizens of a state.11 
He suggests that states that are nonliberal domestically (but well-ordered), can be 
liberal, in the weak meaning of this word, in international relations. Rawls main-
tains that acceptance to nonliberal peoples is derived from the law of peoples, not 
assumed a priori. He claims that liberal peoples develop the law of peoples to gov-
ern their foreign policy, not knowing if nonliberal peoples are to be accepted or 
not. And since the rules of law of peoples are so minimal (and do not consist of 
something peculiar to liberal states), nonliberal decent peoples would have good 
reasons to accept and to follow them. But granted this two-stepped procedure of 
the original position, it is quite unclear why representatives of liberal democratic states 
who know that they come from such regimes, do not accept more demanding rules of jus-
tice working on liberal values that they all share. This is why I suggest that it must be 
assumed that liberal peoples choose the rules of global justice that are to be ac-
                                                 
11 For instance, it is possible that hierarchic institutions like churches or universities that do not 
treat their members equally respect the right of equality in relations between them, the same re-
gard states (see Rawls [1999c] §8.4., pp. 69-70). 
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cepted by nonliberal peoples too. And this undermines the whole constructivist 
idea of an international original position. If it is not assumed that the principles of 
international conduct should not be peculiar liberal ones, one may ask why peo-
ples reject any distribution of wealth between them that go beyond a scope of a 
mere duty of assistance. Coming up with similar arguments to those which Rawls 
advanced for a difference principle in a theory of justice, one may ask why exist-
ing inequalities between societies should not be reduced, if distribution of primary 
goods is arbitrary (some societies have more natural resources and some have not 
at all) and it is not anybody’s fault that he or she was born in a particular society. 
If they were making principles for their societies and did not know if they repre-
sent a poor or a wealthy society, it is tempting to suggest that they would adopt a 
difference principle which ensures a distribution of wealth among societies. Why 
are they indifferent between wealth and poverty in their agreement on justice? The 
argument that egalitarian principles of distribution are to be rejected since they are 
unacceptable by nonliberal peoples has failed. There must be then another argu-
ment to justify this. This argument can be found in an assumption of self-
sufficiency of states. Let us consider it. 
Objection 4: self-sufficiency of states 
Rawls maintains that inequalities of wealth do not matter in international rela-
tions because of two reasons: (1) internal origins of wealth and poverty; (2) ille-
gitimacy of paying bills by one society for another one. First of all, poverty de-
pends in Rawls’s opinion on domestic policy and the political culture of a state 
and no financial foreign aid can do much about combating it. Secondly, Rawls 
claims that the domestic argument of unequal chances is inapplicable since a 
state’s poverty is not determined by external factors (by distribution of goods 
among states). Peoples are seen by Rawls as closed institutional schemes, economi-
cally self-sufficient (i.e. each society can produce all the goods its citizens need) and 
distributionally autonomous (i.e. each society can determine a distribution of goods 
among its citizens). Their wealth and position is dependent neither on the natural 
resources they have nor any other external factors but on their political culture 
and own efforts. And political culture cannot be imported from outside but has to 
be developed by the inhabitants. Thus, any kind of redistribution of goods or re-
sources cannot make people affluent. Rawls agrees that there are situations in 
which peoples are too poor to develop their institutions and political culture by 
themselves and this is the only situation in which some kind of redistribution is 
foreseen. Rawls rejects the idea of global egalitarian principle, because in his opin-
ion, a society that is ‘liberal’ or ‘decent’ has freely decided how much to invest. 
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Consequently the law of peoples aims at guaranteeing the conditions in which all 
societies are in a position to create just institutions and therefore to determine their 
future on their own. Rawls gives two counterexamples to illustrate that a differ-
ence principle cannot be applied in a society of peoples and one of them sounds: 
Two liberal or decent countries are at the same level of wealth and have the same 
size population. The first decides to industrialize and to increase its rate of (real) 
saving, while the second does not. Being content with things as they are, and pre-
ferring a more pastoral and leisurely society, the second reaffirms its social values. 
Some decades later, the first is twice as wealthy as the second. Assuming, as we 
do, that both societies are liberal or decent, and their peoples free and responsible, 
and able to make their own decisions, should the industrializing country be taxed 
to give funds to the second ? […] This seems unacceptable.12 
The point Rawls is trying to make is simply that the only aim of the law of 
peoples is to realise and maintain internal justice of all members of society of peo-
ples. In keeping with this, the representatives of well-ordered societies in an inter-
national original position do not care about being wealthy or poor, but about be-
ing just. So long as societies are in a position to have just institutions, their impres-
sions of unjust inequalities among the societies are, in the opinion of Rawls, not 
legitimate. A duty of assistance, which Rawls prefers in international relations, has 
its strictly defined aim and a cut-off point, beyond which it is no longer required 
since, ‘surely there is a point at which a people's basic needs (estimated in primary 
goods) are fulfilled and a people can stand on its own.’13 Individuals within a soci-
ety are in another situation, as Rawls argues, because their status in life is to a 
large degree, determined by an arbitrary distribution of primary goods. Rawls 
distinguishes between the notion of ‘equality’ at the level of individuals and at the 
level of states. Both kinds of equality regard equality of opportunity but this 
should be in the opinion of Rawls understood differently in both dimensions. 
Equality of opportunity among individuals entails equality of economic and social 
distribution of goods and should be guaranteed by two principles of justice as 
fairness. Equality of opportunity between peoples, on the other hand, entails 
equality of rights in a society of peoples guaranteed by the principles of the law of 
peoples. Peoples acquire to preserve and secure their own autonomy and equality, 
but they do not acquire to reduce inequalities in wealth and power among them 
since it is has no meaning for their equality and autonomy in Rawls’ opinion. 
                                                 
12 Rawls [1999c] p. 121. 
13 Ibid., p. 117. 
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One may argue that such criteria of global justice would be sufficient if 
modern states were indeed self-sufficient and closed associations that do not in-
fluence one another. Actually, discussing a problem of justice in a world of self-
sufficient and absolutely isolated states that do not interact with each other seems 
to be purely academic since all agree that there is and will be extensive global in-
terdependence. And therefore, all should agree that wealth and power are not 
solely matters of our domestic institutions but they are to a certain degree, deter-
mined by international relations with other states. What is more, wealth and 
power of a state are not indifferent in international relations and may distort equal 
position and equal rights of states in international realm, especially when they can 
affect the bargaining power of states in international agreements. If we want to 
guarantee equal rights and opportunities of states, their equal access to the global 
market and global decisions, we cannot disregard global distribution of wealth 
among states. The point is that global interactions have profound effects and in-
fluence on states and their citizens, partly determining the prospects of individu-
als and also the whole of societies. Appealing to Rawlsian example given above, 
we cannot assume that states have an equal starting position, but some of them 
invest properly and some of them not. In fact, there is no such a situation of equal 
starting positions. Positions of states are determined, but miscellaneous factors be-
sides domestic institutions and political culture, such as: difficult geopolitical posi-
tion of a state, long lasting occupation, totalitarian government, natural disasters 
etc. The question is if citizens of such a state that has just institutions but is very 
poor and need a long time to achieve a level of affluence of some other luckier so-
cieties, have to suffer just because they have bad luck to be born in a state that had 
bad luck too? 
What is more, Rawls does not concern himself with such problems as fam-
ine or extreme poverty. He overlooks that it may happen that a society has just 
democratic institutions (such as Ghana) but nevertheless suffers from extreme 
poverty. 
Objection 5: tolerance 
Last but not least, there is another serious problem that arises here – a prob-
lem of including nonliberal decent states into a society of peoples.14 Rawls argues 
                                                 
14 See an insightful analysis of this problem in Tan [2000]. The author analysis two conceptions of 
liberalism – political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism – applied to the global realm. He 
criticizes the former one which fails to meet requirements of global justice because of its mistaken 
stress on toleration as the fundamental principle (see especially chapter 2 and 3, p. 19-77). Actually, 
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that it is required because tolerance, is the core liberal principle. ‘Tolerance’ means 
that we do not accept some kind of beliefs or practices of others but we self-
restrain ourselves from intervening to change them because we recognise the right 
of others to think and to act in a different way. Intolerance, on the other hand, is a 
lack of tolerance and results with intervening to change someone’s beliefs or prac-
tices that we do not accept. 
In the law of peoples any kind of intolerance is rejected. The principles that 
say about conditions of humanitarian intervention (in the case of outlaw societies) 
and about a duty of assistance (in the case of burdened societies) are based on 
some kind of paternalism. And paternalism should be distinguished from intoler-
ance. Paternalism is a way of treating subordinates by a person or a government in 
a fatherly manner, i.e. intervene in their life for their own good, providing their 
needs without assigning them responsibilities for their own actions and by depriv-
ing them of rights to decide by themselves. It is based on two assumptions: (1) that 
from some reason some people do not know what is good for them and (2) their 
current beliefs and practices are harmful for them but are not recognised as such 
by themselves. 
Within a society of peoples there is no place for paternalism since all peo-
ples are equal. Decent peoples are treated within a society of peoples according to 
the principle of tolerance that is not equivalent with acceptance of their govern-
ments, political values and internal inequalities. But Rawls does not stop here with 
a negative requirement of a general prohibition of intervention that could be de-
rived from the principle of tolerance. He goes one step further, claiming for a posi-
tive requirement of including decent peoples into a society of peoples. This is 
based on something more than tolerance – on respect to all well-ordered societies that 
meet weak conditions of being decent. It means that we must assume that in an inter-
national realm just some urgent human rights (i.e. the right to life, to liberty, to 
property and formal justice)15 are to be met and that the more demanding list of 
                                                                                                                                                    
I do not refer to this distinction and develop only some general objections, leaving this interesting 
internal debate within liberal doctrine aside. 
15 By the right to life Rawls means right to the means of subsistence and security since ‘the sensible 
and rational exercise of all liberties […] as well as the intelligent use of property, always implies 
having general all-purpose economic means’ (Rawls [1999c] §8.2., p. 65, footnote 1). By the right of 
liberty he means right to freedom from slavery, serfdom and forced occupation, and liberty (but not 
equal liberty) of conscience. By the right to property he means the right to personal property. By the 
right to formal justice he means that the rule that similar cases should be treated similarly. These set 
of basic human rights Rawls calls urgent rights that have universal meaning and cannot be treated 
as peculiarly liberal or characteristic for Western civilization only (ibid., §8.2., p. 65). These rights 
are to be respected by all peoples according to the law of peoples. These basic human rights indi-
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human rights is a matter of domestic legal order only. Thus, Rawls (like defenders 
of moderate nationalism) calls for a split-level justice. This is the reason why 
apologists of egalitarian Rawlsian doctrine of liberal justice feel ‘betrayed’ by 
Rawls in the global realm and deeply unsatisfied with the conclusions that he 
drives in the law of peoples. 
From the point of view of my analysis, it is important how Rawls justifies 
this limiting scope of some liberal principles of justice that are universal in their 
assumptions. And this justification is based on a normative assumption of peo-
ple’s autonomy and independence, i.e. state’s sovereignty. However limited this 
sovereignty is by the law of peoples, it is guaranteed as the essential right of each 
state. We cannot intervene in internal matters that are on the other side of borders 
(except a special situations of violating basic human rights by outlaw societies) 
because of this state’s right to autonomy, so the argument goes. And because of 
this right to autonomy, we owe toleration to each state that meet conditions of de-
cency. This argument is based on an analogy between tolerance within individuals 
– citizens of a liberal states that have different, usually contradictory, comprehen-
sive doctrines. But is this analogy between corporate bodies such as states and in-
dividuals really adequate? 
If we claim for tolerance between individuals, we mean that every person 
should have an equal right to determine his or her life by one’s own (that nobody, 
but me, should decide what is good for me, what kind of life should I live). The 
Rawlsian idea of tolerance between peoples provides, by analogy, that each soci-
ety should have an equal right to determine its future and order by its own. But 
the difference is that such corporate bodies as states determine the lives of their 
citizens. Neglecting this distinction between autonomy at the level of individuals 
and at the level of states could be justified only if we assume that state’s govern-
ment represents the interests of its citizens (assuming democratic legitimacy). In 
such a situation tolerance towards nonliberal well-ordered societies would be 
identified with respect given to a group of people to organize themselves in a kind 
of institutional framework governed by a conception of justice they accept. This 
seems to be suggested by Rawls in his previous version of the law of peoples that 
he presented in his article, where we can read: ‘its members [members of a nonliberal 
society – M.S.] accept basic inequalities among themselves’.16 But this passage from 
Rawls’s article has been changed in his book version where we can read only that 
                                                                                                                                                    
cate the limits of tolerance, reasonable pluralism and state’s autonomy – if they are violated, well-
ordered peoples can even intervene to force them. 
16 Rawls [1999b] p. 549. 
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an idea of justice in a decent nonliberal society allows basic inequalities but, not 
that these inequalities are accepted by its members.17. Description of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of a decent society may suggest that if such a society has 
a decent consultation hierarchy, it would represent all members’ interests since it 
allows them to take part in making political decisions. But these members are not 
represented equally in their government since it is not a democratic society.18 A 
government of a nonliberal state does not have a democratic legitimacy over all its 
citizens since it rejects the recognition of a moral equality of all its citizens, which 
is a peculiarly liberal feature. Hence, Rawls by claiming that tolerance towards 
nonliberal societies ‘is defending the rights of states to enforce inegalitarian poli-
cies against its own citizens, even if these citizens are not united in agreement with 
the inegalitarian policy’ as Blake points out.19 It means that tolerance among peo-
ples can be at the price of freedom of each individual to choose his or her way of 
life. 
It would be better, in my opinion, to consider a situation of nonliberal peo-
ples in a society of peoples by the analogy to a situation of nonliberal involuntary 
associations within a liberal society (such as families, churches, ethnic minorities 
etc. to which one may belong by birth and that may be governed in a non-
democratic way).20 In a liberal democratic society where the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism is granted, its citizens owe toleration to each other and to groups in which 
they are joined. As Michael Walzer writes, tolerance becomes more difficult and 
complicated if we take into consideration that in the subject of tolerance we have 
to count both: individuals and groups.21 And we also have to take into considera-
tion that people belong to different groups at the same time and that some of these 
groups give priority to the common good of the group over the individual. In such 
a situation, very often there are conflicts between individual and collective rights 
or values. However liberal democratic societies give priority to protection of indi-
vidual rights of their citizens, there is tolerance to existence of groups that deprive 
their members from some of their rights. But one of the conditions that member-
ship in such nonliberal involuntary associations should meet is – escape clause, i.e. 
                                                 
17 See Rawls [1999c] §8.4., p. 70. 
18 E.g. people that do not share a comprehensive doctrine of a society can be tolerated and even 
represented in a government but as a group they do not have equal right to all political positions 
and offices; there is no democratic rule that each person has one equal voice, but different people 
may have different places in a hierarchy of groups to which they belong. 
19 Blake [2005] p. 32. 
20 See Walzer [2006] pp. 14-40. 
21 See Walzer [1999] p. 57. 
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the right of each member to leave the group he or she belongs to. We could apply 
the same requirement to justify tolerance in the international realm within a soci-
ety of peoples. And in the article version of The Law of Peoples, Rawls writes explic-
itly that hierarchical societies that are not liberal but decent ones, must allow for 
the right of emigration.22 But in his book version, Rawls decides to leave the problem 
of migration aside, since, as he argues, it cannot occur in a society of peoples 
where basic human right are met (he means that people have no good reason to 
emigrate). This latter statement of the law of peoples seems very unconvincing to 
me. 
The tension between individual rights and the rights of corporate bodies 
seems dissolvable. Blake claims that this is a problem of tension between stability 
and justice that domestically go together, but in the international realm we have to 
choose between them.23 Stability means respecting the state’s autonomy, justice 
means guaranteeing individual rights and liberties. Does it always have to stay a 
matter of choice? This is one of the crucial points of each political liberalism – the 
problem of the boundaries of tolerance that occurs in both the domestic and global 
realm. Within a society the problem of reconciling the duties of each citizen, which 
she has towards other co-citizens and towards the common good with the right of 
citizens to associate themselves and to realise their comprehensive doctrines they 
represent. Within a society of peoples there is the problem of reconciling the du-
ties of each person that they have towards other peoples (and I shall add here, 
however the law of peoples does not entails this, towards the common good of our 
humanity and our planet) with the right of people to realise their comprehensive 
doctrines or conceptions of justice they represent. Rawls specifies these borders of 
tolerance quite precisely – we owe tolerance only to tolerant ones, it is justified by 
the rule of reciprocity. But he means tolerance at the level of states and overlooks a 
problem of internal tolerance and individual rights of those who are not repre-
sented by their undemocratic governments. Rawls tries to solve this problem in 
both realms in the same way, on the basis of political liberalism (invoking an over-
lapping consensus) but neglects troubling differences of these realms and its con-
sequences. This is the pivotal problem of liberal conceptions of global justice that 
either accept equality and autonomy of states or equality and freedom of indi-
viduals. The former ones avoid paternalism but fall into dangerous acceptance of 
violating individual equality and freedom. The latter ones, on the other hand, fall 
into paternalism and violate state’s autonomy and equality. 
                                                 
22 Rawls [1999b] p. 547. 
23 Blake [2005] p. 32. 
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Conclusions 
To sum up, distribution of burdens and benefits goes far beyond state bor-
ders and Rawlsian conception though consequent seems to be either unjustified 
with its limited scope or incomplete. As Michael Blake argues, Rawls’s conception 
of the law of peoples is not misleading, but incomplete and his methodology 
stands in need of justification.24 Cosmopolitan ideas of globalizing justice as fair-
ness, on the other hand, are misleading, by overlooking a significant difference 
between the domestic and global situation to which the principles of justice are 
applied. There is no reason to suppose that the principles satisfactory for the basic 
structure of a society would also be satisfactory for the world order of sovereign 
states: ‘the conditions for the law of nations may require different principles ar-
rived at in a somewhat different way’25 – as Rawls suggests. The global difference 
principle is too demanding and not justified in the global realm. Nevertheless, it 
does not exclude distributive justice at the level of states. 
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